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A Real Options Valuation Model is developed to recom-
mend how to valuate technology when benefits cannot 
be measured in monetary value. Expected values of 
effectiveness are used to select the preferred alterna-
tive. The methodology is illustrated using three guidance 
system technologies in the Army’s Javelin program. The 
strategy created multiple real options that gave the Army 
the right (without the obligation) to select one guidance 
system technology based on the outcome of technology 
development tests. Results indicate the Army paid 
less than the total value of the options, but could have 
increased net savings by paying different amounts to test 
each alternative. The analysis method provides a logical 
and defendable approach to the analysis of alternatives 
under technology development uncertainty. 
« Image designed by Diane Fleischer 
669 Defense ARJ, July 2014, Vol. 21 No. 3 : 668–692
A Publication of the Defense Acquisition Universityhttp://www.dau.mil
Real options can be described along several 
dimensions, including ownership, the source of 
value, complexity, and the degree to which the 
option is available.
Competitive prototyping along the path of technology development 
has long been an important aspect of acquisition program strategies. 
Emphasis in this method reemerged in policy documents again in 2007 
as a way to reduce technical, cost, and schedule risk by leveraging the 
economic forces of competition and innovation diversity (Young, 2007). 
Academics understand these fundamentals and their multiple benefits 
as “real options.” This article describes the application of a Real Options 
Valuation Model to the three candidate guidance technologies during 
the early development of the Javelin anti-tank missile system. A short 
introduction to Real Options Theory is followed by a description of the 
Javelin guidance technology options. Next, a model for measuring the 
effectiveness of the three guidance technologies is presented and the cost 
effectiveness of each alternative based on “cost per kill” under determin-
istic and probabilistic assumptions examined. Finally, a decision tree 
approach is used to model the value of each option, given the probability 
of success and the costs to recover from failure. 
Real Options
Real Options Theory is one means of structuring and valuing flexible 
strategies to address uncertainty (Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997). 
An option is a right without an obligation to take specific future actions 
depending on how uncertain conditions evolve (Brealey & Meyers, 2000). 
Real options apply Real Options Theory to tangible assets. The central 
premise of Real Options Theory is that, if future conditions are uncertain 
and changing the strategy later incurs substantial costs, then having 
flexible strategies and delaying decisions can add value when compared 
to making all strategic decisions during preproject planning (Amram & 
Kulatilaka, 1999a, 1999b). By providing managers with tools to respond 
to changing conditions, real options can increase benefits, limit costs, or 
both. When used to limit costs of development programs such as in the 
current work, real options are a form of risk management.
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The design of an option compares one or more alternative strategies 
that may be used in the future to a reference strategy that is committed 
to in the present. To use an option, conditions are monitored and poten-
tially converted into a signal that is compared to trigger conditions using 
an Exercise Decision Rule. The result is a recommendation on whether 
to abandon the reference strategy and adopt the alternative strategy 
(to “exercise” the option) or to keep using the reference strategy. For 
example, in stock purchase options, the Exercise Decision Rule is to buy 
a stock if the price rises above a certain price and the exercise signal is 
the stock price. The decision delay is incurred while the option holder 
waits to see if the stock price rises above the exercise price. Options 
help managers learn by having them wait to see (through monitoring) 
how uncertainty evolves, thereby helping them make better choices. 
Therefore, delayed decision making is an important feature of real 
options. To use real options, one must define the exercise signal and 
exercise decision in the context of a set of observable variables and the 
exercise of the option in operational terms. 
Real options can be described along several dimensions, including 
ownership, the source of value, complexity, and the degree to which the 
option is available. A common topology categorizes real options accord-
ing to the type of managerial action applied, including options that 
postpone (holding and phasing options), change the amount of invest-
ment (growth, scaling, and abandonment options), or alter the form of 
involvement (switching options). The study of real options can focus on 
the monetary valuation of the flexibility or on the design and impacts of 
real options on decision making in practice (managerial real options). 
Both of these aspects of real options can improve program manage-
ment and add value. Although some real options can be purchased and 
exercised at low cost (e.g., the option to have salaried employees work 
overtime), decisions about real options become challenging when sig-
nificant costs are required to obtain, maintain, or exercise the flexibility 
that may add value. The option cost is what must be paid to acquire the 
f lexibility to change the strategy. Option maintenance costs include 
benefits lost by delaying the decision and costs to keep the flexibility 
available. Option exercise costs are the costs of changing the strategy. 
A wide variety of mathematical models have been developed to estimate 
the monetary value of options. These models use the characteristics of 
the asset and the benefits and costs of an option to estimate its value. 
Option valuation began with efforts to price options on financial assets 
(e.g., shares of stock, bonds) and other market-traded assets. Initially, 
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closed-form solutions to very specific situations with stringent limits 
were developed (e.g., Black & Scholes, 1973). Later models, such as the 
binomial lattice model (Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979), were developed 
that could be used to value a wider variety of options and assets. 
Real Options Valuation Models have been 
effectively used to demonstrate how real options 
can increase project value, including through 
engineering design….
The valuation of real options differs from that of financial options in 
that the underlying assets are real assets that are often not traded and 
represent, for example, contingent decisions to delay, abandon, expand, 
contract, or switch project components or methods. Conventionally, 
researchers have estimated the value of real options based on approaches 
used to value financial options. Real options valuation methods have been 
developed and analyzed (Borison, 2005; Brealey & Meyers, 2000; Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994; Kulatilaka, 1995; Lander, 1997; Lander & Pinches, 1998; 
McDonald, 2006; Quigg, 1993; Teisberg, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1993, 1995, 
2005) and used to value strategies in many domains, including specific 
aspects of product development (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999a; Brennan & 
Trigeorgis, 2000; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Kemna, 1993; Miller & Lessard, 
2000; Trigeorgis, 1995). Examples include valuation of options to hedge 
technology investment risk (Benaroch, 2001), and application to design 
modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), research and development resource 
allocation (Sharpe & Keelin, 1998), and maximum price contracts for 
construction project options (Bounkendour & Bah, 2001). Real Options 
Valuation Models have been effectively used to demonstrate how real 
options can increase project value, including through engineering design 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ford, Lander, & Voyer, 2002; Park & Herath, 
2000; Zhao & Tseng, 2003), testing, and learning through pilot projects 
(Benaroch, 2001; Sadowsky, 2005), schedule control (Ford & Bhargav, 
2006), and financing (Cheah & Garvin, 2008; Ho & Liu, 2002). Other 
research has demonstrated the application of real options, for example, 
to natural resources and land development; f lexible manufacturing; 
research, development, and innovation; mergers and acquisitions; leases; 
and the labor force. 
672Defense ARJ, July 2014, Vol. 21 No. 3 : 668–692
Valuation of Real Options as Competitive Prototyping in System Development
Much of the formal modeling of real options has focused on valuing 
(in monetary terms) options for specific asset characteristics (e.g., value, 
uncertainty) and option designs (timing, exercise trigger conditions, and 
exercise costs). But researchers have identified common modeling assump-
tions that do not apply to typical product development projects (Lander & 
Pinches, 1998). Specifically, most Real Options Valuation Models assume 
that: (a) future asset behavior and value conform to well-defined processes, 
(b) markets are complete and arbitrage opportunities are available, (c) 
sources of uncertainty are few and independent, (d) payouts or other costs 
of delaying decisions are small, and (e) planners have one or few options. 
None of these assumptions hold well for product development environ-
ments, where asset value behaviors are not well-defined or market-based, 
many sources of uncertainty exist and interact, delaying decisions can be 
very costly, and planners usually have, practically speaking, unlimited 
options. In addition, Alessandri, Ford, Lander, Leggio, and Taylor (2004) 
describe problems posed by assuming that asset performance and option 
holder activity are independent, when in fact product development option 
holders (i.e., project managers) purposefully and significantly manipulate 
the linkages between uncertainties and project values. 
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In contrast to a focus on option valuation, managerial real options 
work to improve decision making by structuring risky circumstances 
faced by practitioners into real options and facilitating option design and 
implementation. Managerial real options address many of the challenges of 
using Real Options Valuation Models to improve risk management (Garvin 
& Ford, 2012; Triantis, 2005). Structuring risk management challenges in 
development programs as real options requires describing challenges with 
standard real options parameters and structures (Miller & Lessard, 2000). 
Thereby, real options can improve managerial understanding of risks and 
help managers prepare for risk management strategy design (Amram & 
Kulatilaka, 1999a, 1999b; Bierman & Smidt, 1992; Courtney et al., 1997; 
Kensinger, 1988). Potential benefits of real options applied to product devel-
opment stem from several sources, including: a broader range of strategies 
considered, a focus on objectives instead of solutions, sensitivity to multiple 
project futures, more frequent testing of plans, and increased awareness of 
the value of flexibility (Ford, Lander, & Voyer, 2004). 
Consider the example of the use of options to manage technology 
development risk for the Department of Energy’s $2.4 billion National 
Ignition Facility (Ceylan & Ford, 2002). The National Ignition Facility 
(NIF) needed to develop slabs of laser glass to be used in the testing 
of nuclear weapons and research. Laser glass procurement required 
the production of high-quality glass slabs called “blanks.” No exist-
ing glass production technologies could produce the volume of glass 
blanks needed. The ability of glass firms to develop the required new 
technologies and the quality of the glass produced if the production 
technologies were feasible, were very uncertain as were costs and devel-
opment schedules. Although NIF had relationships with experienced 
laser glass vendors, none could guarantee successful development within 
the required time a priori. Therefore, the NIF program managers funded 
the development of new laser glass production technology. NIF needed 
a higher likelihood of success than any one vendor could provide, so it 
chose to hire two firms to simultaneously begin initial development of a 
technology to produce the blanks and to fund these development efforts 
in phases. Program managers explicitly incorporated the flexibility to 
choose at several stages to: (a) continue funding both companies and 
their technology development, (b) fund only one company going for-
ward, or (c) discontinue funding both companies and explore alternative 
sources for the blank development. The choice at each stage was based 
on what the managers had learned about the likelihood of success of 
the developing firms in meeting expectations (benefits) and the cost of 
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continuing to fund the research and development. Through real options 
analysis (but not formal option valuation), NIF managers were able to 
assess the cost effectiveness of their options at each stage. This analysis 
assisted managers in project management decision making by providing 
a reliable decision tool. See Alessandri et al. (2004), Cao, Ford, and Leggio 
(2006), and Ceylan and Ford (2002) for more detail and an analysis of the 
use of real options in managing risk at NIF. The NIF example illustrates 
the critical role of managerial decision making in the application of real 
options to risk management in development programs. 
Specific and required decisions in the management 
of risk in an actual development program created 
the need and opportunity for real options.
The current work integrates the managerial and valuation aspects 
of real options. Specific and required decisions in the management of 
risk in an actual development program created the need and opportunity 
for real options. A simple and intuitive approach is used to estimate the 
value of options as the difference between the values of the program with 
and without the options (e.g., by assuming uncertainty impacts future 
performance versus assuming a single specific and known future). The 
valuations are used to recommend managerial actions and improve the 
understanding of the risk and its management. 
Javelin Technology Options
Anti-tank weapons have been important to meeting Department 
of Defense objectives since the appearance of armored vehicles on the 
modern battlefield in World War I. From the 1960s through 1970s, the 
M67 90mm recoilless rif le was used as a primary mounted and dis-
mounted infantry weapon against tanks and armored personnel carriers. 
This weapon was replaced by the DRAGON anti-tank weapon system, 
introduced in the late 1970s, which had a wired command link that was 
employed to guide the missile to a target that was optically tracked by the 
gunner. The DRAGON system was developed in the 1960s as a response 
to the Soviet development of the AT-3 SAGGER manpack missile system, 
carried in a fiberglass container about the size of a small suitcase. But 
the DRAGON system had reliability problems, and limited range and 
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lethality, and it was difficult for gunners to aim the missile and track 
the target. In the 1980s, the goal was to replace DRAGON with a weapon 
with increased range and lethality and less weight (a later requirement 
emerged for the ability to be launched from inside an enclosure [e.g., 
buildings and bunkers]). The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–
Medium (AAWS–M) project grew into the Javelin anti-tank missile 
program. Javelin required several emergent technologies to successfully 
attain program requirements. A number of the subsystems were based 
upon these immature technologies. The target locating and missile 
guidance subsystems were particularly troublesome technical issues. 
Three very different technologies—a laser-beam riding (LBR) system, a 
fiber-optic (FO) guided system, and the forward looking infrared (FLIR) 
system—were initially considered in a 27-month technology development 
phase, aimed at not constraining the eventual materiel solution. Each of 
the three potential technologies generally offered the needed capabilities 
and represented acquisition options. 
The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–
Medium (AAWS–M) project grew into the Javelin 
anti-tank missile program.
Three contractor teams were formed to develop competing proto-
type guidance technologies for the Javelin. Only one team was to be 
chosen for follow-on advanced development and then production. Ford 
Aerospace was teamed with its partner, Loral Systems, offering the LBR 
missile. Hughes Aircraft was teamed with Boeing, offering an FO guided 
missile. Texas Instruments was teamed with Martin Marietta, offer-
ing an imaging infrared or FLIR missile system. With the LBR system, 
the gunner identifies the target visually and points a laser beam at the 
target throughout flight. After launch, the missile continuously corrects 
its flight to match the line of the laser (to “ride” the laser beam) to the 
target. The FO system includes a coil of very long and fine optical fiber 
that connects the launch unit, operated by the gunner, to a camera in 
the nose of the missile. The gunner flies the missile to the target using 
a joystick controller device. The FLIR scans the view in front of the 
gunner and generates a thermal-based image of the target area. Once 
observed through the Command Launch Unit, or thermal sight, the 
gunner switches to a staring array in the missile to acquire the target 
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by narrowing brackets in the viewfinder around the target with a thumb 
switch. After launch, the missile continuously corrects its flight path 
using a tracking algorithm that employs optical correlators oriented 
upon visible and distinct target features. 
Each candidate system had specific advantages and disadvantages: 
• The Ford/Loral LBR required an exposed gunner and man-
in-loop throughout its rapid f light. It was cheapest at an 
estimated $90,000 cost per kill—a figure that was com-
prised not only of average unit production cost estimates, 
but also reliability and accuracy estimates. It was fairly 
effective in terms of potential combat utility, with dimin-
ishing probability-of-hit at increasing range. Top-attack 
on armor would be dependent upon precision fusing and 
detonation, and accuracy of downward-firing explosively 
formed projectiles from shaped charges.
• The Hughes/Boeing FO g uide prototype enabled an 
unexposed gunner (once launched) and also required man-
in-loop throughout its slower flight. It was judged as likely 
costlier, but less affected by accuracy throughout range 
with its automatic lock and guidance in its terminal stage of 
flight, and offered target switching. It was also more gunner 
training- and learning-intensive, but could attack targets 
from above, where the armor was thinnest.
• The FLIR prototype offered completely autonomous fire-
and-forget flight to target after launch, but was perceived 
as both the costliest and the most technologically risky 
alternative. The gunner would only be initially exposed 
during target engagement. It would be the easiest system 
upon which to deliver user training and effective to maxi-
mum ranges by means of its target acquisition sensor and 
guidance packages. It used top attack as a more effective 
means of armored target defeat, but would also have a flat 
trajectory capability for direct fire against targets under 
cover of bridges, trees, buildings, etc. 
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Effectiveness of Technology Options
To choose a technology option, the Javelin development team per-
formed an analysis of alternatives based on the relative benefits and 
costs of each alternative, (i.e., each alternative’s cost effectiveness). 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate whenever dollar values cannot 
TABLE 1. ANTI-TANK MISSILE GUIDANCE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
Objective LBR FO FLIR
Measure Weight Value Score Value Score Value Score
Lethality 0.3
P(H)*P(K)** 0.7 5 1.05 4 0.84 7 1.47




Weight 0.4 9 1.08 5 0.6 3 0.36
Time to engage 0.3 8 0.72 7 0.63 5 0.45
Time of flight 0.2 7 0.42 5 0.3 5 0.3
Redirect 




training 0.2 5 0.3 1 0.6 10 0.6
Exposure after 




procurement 1.0 8 0.8 6 0.6 4 0.4
Total 1.0
MOE (Total)*** 1.0 5.69 6.42 6.79
*P(H) = Probability of hit
**P(K) = Probability of kill
***MOE = Measure of effectiveness
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be assigned to benefits, as is the case for most defense systems (Office 
of Management and Budget, 1992). To evaluate the effectiveness of 
each Javelin guidance system alternative, we use a simple hierarchical 
model based on the acquisition objectives identified for the anti-tank 
missile—lethality, tactical advantage, gunner safety, and procurement.1 
Our multiobjective effectiveness model is based on concepts developed 
in decision science (Buede, 1986; Keeney, 1982; Keeney, 1988). The first 
three objectives deal with the operational effectiveness of the missile, 
while the procurement objective recognizes that transaction costs and 
technology issues make some alternatives easier to procure than others. 
Under each objective, we can use metrics to measure how well the objec-
tive is achieved. The objectives and corresponding metrics (measures) 
are shown in Table 1. The table also shows the relative importance of 
objectives and the relative importance of each measure with respect to 
an objective by the weight assigned to each objective and measure. 
The metric values achieved by each technology are converted to a 
notional value measured on a scale of 0 to 10, indicating the value the 
Army assigned to the actual level of performance. A notional measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) achieved by each of the three alternatives is shown at 
the bottom of Table 1. The scores shown in Table 1 for each metric (mea-
sure) are calculated by multiplying the value for the measure times the 
weight for that measure times the objective weight. The notional MOEs 
in Table 1 are consistent with the Army’s Source Selection Evaluation 
Board (SSEB) preference for the three guidance technologies, in that the 
SSEB preferred FLIR over the other two guidance systems and perceived 
the FO system as being slightly better than the LBR system.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The previous section considered only the relative effectiveness of the 
three guidance alternatives. To select the best alternative, we must also 
consider the development and procurement costs. Table 2 shows notional 
values for the cost per missile for each alternative and the total program 
TABLE 2. ANTI-TANK MISSILE COST
LBR FO FLIR
Cost/missile ($M) $0.09 $0.11 $0.15
Program Cost ($M) $180 $220 $300
679 Defense ARJ, July 2014, Vol. 21 No. 3 : 668–692
A Publication of the Defense Acquisition University http://www.dau.mil
cost for each alternative assuming 2,000 missiles are procured. A cost 
versus effectiveness graph is shown in Figure 1. The total program cost 
and MOE for each alternative are shown on the graph. 
Figure 1 illustrates that no alternative dominates another, meaning 
no alternative is both cheaper and more effective than another. Thus, 
we must look at the marginal benefit and marginal cost to evaluate the 
alternatives. The LBR alternative is the least costly and least effective. We 
compare it to the FO alternative in Table 3 and note that the marginal cost 
of choosing FO over LBR is $40 million. Table 3 also shows the difference 
in values for each of the effectiveness measures used to calculate the MOE 
between the two alternatives. A positive change represents an increase in 
effectiveness, while a negative difference indicates a decrease in effective-
ness. A similar analysis for FO versus FLIR is shown in Table 4.
While Figure 1 gives us an overall picture of the cost versus effective-
ness of the three alternatives, Tables 3 and 4 show what is gained and lost 
at the margin when going from one technology to the next. Arguably, this 






























FIGURE 1.  ANTI-TANK MISSILE TOTAL PROGRAM COST VS. 
EFFECTIVENESS
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in seeing what specifically they are getting for their investment. In addi-
tion, because the MOE is a combination of different metrics that are not 
necessarily interchangeable, it would not make sense to simply calculate 
the ratio of MOE to cost. Instead, the marginal analysis defines the trade-
off space, but not the solution, for the decision makers.
The previous cost versus effectiveness analysis assumed that all the 
guidance technology development efforts would be equally successful 
and achieve the calculated MOEs. But at the start of the proof-of-prin-
ciple effort, there was no assurance that any of the technologies would 
be successfully developed. In fact, the probability of success differed 
between the three alternatives. A notional assessment of the probability 
of success2 for each option is given in Table 5. 
Table 5 also shows the expected MOE based on the given probability 
of success for each option. The expected MOE is the product of the MOE 
shown in Table 1 and the probability of success. 
Table 5 incorporates uncertainty into the estimate of the benefits 
(as measured by the MOE) of each alternative. However, it does not 
incorporate uncertainty into the costs of those alternatives. Each of the 
alternatives has an expected cost based on the uncertainty associated 
with the technology development. If the development effort fails, we 
assume the Army will have to pay some additional cost to finish devel-
oping the technology and achieve the anticipated level of effectiveness 
(MOE). We refer to this additional cost as the “cost to fix” the technol-
ogy. If the technology development phase is successful, then the cost to 
exercise the option will be the total program cost from Table 2 and is 
shown as “cost to implement” in Table 6. If the technology development 
phase fails, the cost of the alternative will be the cost to implement plus 
the cost to fix the technology. The total expected cost of each alternative 
is given in Table 6. 
The values shown in Table 6 assume that one of the technologies will 
be picked based on the cost-versus-benefit analysis presented above and 
that, whichever technology is chosen, there is an additional cost to achieve 
the anticipated effectiveness (MOE) if the development phase fails. Figure 
2 incorporates uncertainty into our analysis, showing expected cost (from 
Table 6) versus expected effectiveness (from Table 5). 
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TABLE 3.  MARGINAL ANALYSIS OF COST AND EFFECTIVENESS 
FOR LBR AND FO
Marginal Analysis LBR FO Difference
Program Cost ($M) $180 $220 $40
P(H) P(K) 5 4 -1
Top attack 6 7 +1
Weight 9 5 -4
Time to engage 8 7 -1
Time of flight 7 5 -2
Redirect capability 10 10 0
Required training 5 1 -4
Exposure after launch 2 8 +6
Ease of procurement 8 6 -2
TABLE 4. MARGINAL ANALYSIS OF COST AND EFFECTIVENESS 
FOR FO AND FLIR
Marginal Analysis FO FLIR Difference
Program Cost ($M) $220 $300 $80
P(H) P(K) 4 7 +3
Top attack 7 9 +2
Weight 5 3 -2
Time to engage 7 5 -2
Time of flight 5 5 0
Recall capability 10 0 -10
Required training 1 10 +9
Exposure after launch 8 10 +2
Ease of procurement 6 4 -2
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TABLE 5. PROBABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS AND 
EXPECTED MOE FOR JAVELIN TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
LBR FO FLIR
Probability of success 0.6 0.5 0.4
Expected measure of 
effectiveness
3.414 2.94 2.716
TABLE 6. EXPECTED COST OF JAVELIN GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY 
ALTERNATIVES WITHOUT OPTION TO TERMINATE PROJECT
LBR FO FLIR
Probability of success 0.6 0.5 0.4
Cost to implement ($M) 180 220 300
Probability of failure 0.4 0.5 0.6
Cost to fix 50 70 90
Total cost to implement 
given failure ($M)
230 290 390
Expected Cost ($M) 200 255 354
TABLE 7. VALUE OF JAVELIN GUIDANCE TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
LBR FO FLIR
Probability of success 0.6 0.5 0.4
Cost to implement 180 220 300
Probability of failure 0.4 0.5 0.6
Cost if project is terminated 0 0 0
Expected cost with option 108 110 120
Expected cost w/o option 200 255 354
Value of option 92 145 234
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Using the expected cost and expected MOE, we see that both the FO 
and FLIR guidance systems are dominated by the LBR system, since it 
is both cheaper and has a higher MOE. This analysis suggests that, based 
on the information available at the beginning of the program, the LBR 
technology should be chosen.3
Value of Technology Options
A real-options approach differs from the choose-early approach above 
in that it purposely delays making a decision while more or better informa-
tion is gathered. The value of a real option is derived from the difference 
between the expected net value (benefits less costs) of an investment and 
the net value of that investment given that it succeeds. In the Javelin case, 
the option value lies in the flexibility to terminate the development of a tech-
nology if it is not successful.4 To develop a simple option valuation model 
for the Javelin guidance technologies, we note that the benefits are given 
by the MOE as shown in Table 1. If we do not use a real-options approach, 
then the costs of each alternative are shown in Table 6. 
Using a real-options approach, the Army pays for the option to find 
out whether the technology development succeeds before making a final 






























FIGURE 2.  ANTI-TANK MISSILE TOTAL EXPECTED PROGRAM 
COST VS. EXPECTED EFFECTIVENESS
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Table 1 and can proceed with the project if we prefer that option (based 
on the cost versus effectiveness analysis presented in the previous sec-
tion). If the development fails, we terminate the project and there is no 
further cost. The value of the option is given by the difference between 
the expected value of the project with no option (from Table 6) and the 
expected value of the project with the option to terminate. The calcula-
tions are shown in Table 7.5
The values of the options for each alternative are different because 
different levels of uncertainty are associated with each technology. For 
example, uncertainty on the two relatively mature technologies (LBR and 
FO) was lower than for the new technology (FLIR). Given that we are willing 
to pay for the technology with no options, the more uncertain the technol-
ogy, the more we value the option to terminate the project if the technology 
development fails. The values shown in Table 7 are maximums in the sense 
that if we pay any more than the option value, we would have been better off 
not using an option. If we pay less than the option value, we experience real 
cost savings by not expending funds on an unsuccessful technology. 
Suppose the Army preferred the LBR technology (based on the cost 
versus effectiveness analysis presented in the previous section). They 
should pay no more than $92 million for the option to terminate the proj-
ect. But the Army decided to buy options for all three technologies, so the 
total amount that they spend on options should not exceed the value of 
the option for the preferred technology. Since the value of the LBR option 
is $92 million, if they allocated the option value equally across all the 
alternatives, they should spend no more than about $30 million for each 
option, which is exactly what the Army did. 
But allocating the option value equally across the alternatives is not 
economically optimized, given that some technologies are more uncer-
tain than others. It would be more rational to allocate the option value 
based on the level of uncertainty that we are trying to resolve. Using the 
probability of failure in Table 7 as a notional measure of risk, we can 
allocate the option value in proportion to that risk, giving 27 percent of 
the total option value to LBR, 33 percent to FO, and 40 percent to FLIR. 
Going back to our previous example, if the Army prefers the LBR tech-
nology, then the total cost of the option should not exceed $92 million. 
That means the Army should pay about $25 million for the LBR option, 
$30 million for the FO option, and $37 million for the FLIR option. Doing 
so allocates the dollars based on risk while keeping the total cost equal 
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to the option value of the preferred alternative. Again, we note that $92 
million is a maximum. To realize any cost savings from the option, the 
Army must pay less than $92 million for all three options.
The Army’s Choice
The Army’s Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) indi-
cated that the LBR was the preferred alternative based on weighted cost/
efficiency factors. At the same time, the SSEB actually chose the FLIR alter-
native because of a bias toward fire and forget. This difference illustrates 
the importance of choosing decision criteria that accurately reflect the 
needs and preferences of warfighters for analysis of alternatives. Although 
time of flight and gunner survivability were not stated requirements in the 
AAWS–M Joint Required Operational Capability document per se, fire 
and forget nevertheless translated into greatly enhanced gunner surviv-
ability and overwhelmingly appealed to user representatives. The resulting 
decision by the SSEB reflected this preference. In June 1989, a full-scale 
development (now called Engineering and Manufacturing Development, or 
EMD) contract was awarded for the AAWS–M project to the joint venture 
team of Texas Instruments and Martin Marietta. At the macro level, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense viewed the program as acceptable regard-
ing risk because of its 27-month technology development phase, use of 
multiple prototypes (real options) for a technical solution, and subsequent 
36-month plan for full-scale development. But at the program office level, 
it was known to be one of high risk in several technical areas. Focal Plane 
Array (FPA) technology was still immature and would be gauged today 
at approximately Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5 (on an increasing 
scale of 1–9), despite its successful technology-development phase results. 
About 18 months into the EMD phase, serious technical problems 
around FPA attainment of specified sensitivity and production yield, 
system weight, tracker algorithm, and other areas doubled the expected 
cost of development and added about 18 more months to the originally 
planned 36 months to complete. Over that next year, the program sought 
a new baseline with many different revised program estimates—climbing 
from 36 months’ duration and $298 million in cost, to 48 months’ dura-
tion and $372 million in cost, and finally, 54 months and $443 million for 
the total cost and duration of this phase. Within that year, the program 
was restructured, given the new baseline, and finished largely within its 
new parameters. The additional 18 months added to the 36-month phase 
helped resolve the uncertainties and complexities of system development 
without additional schedule slippage.
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Today, Javelin is viewed as being a totally successful weapon system, 
despite its much earlier programmatic shortcomings in development. It 
is being used in combat operations and has continued through many full-
rate production contract periods. Over 1,000 Javelin missiles have been 
fired in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom since March 
2003, with close to 98 percent reliability. The system design has con-
tinued to be upgraded—not as blocks of capability, but with incremental 
software, warhead, and producibility enhancements. 
Over 1,000 Javelin missiles have been fired in 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 
since March 2003, with close to 98 percent 
reliability.
Conclusions
Several observations can be made from our analysis of the Javelin 
guidance technology acquisition process. 
The first is that the benefit of weapon systems, or in this case mis-
sile guidance systems, is not measured in dollars. This makes using a 
traditional option valuation model (based on benefits less costs) difficult. 
Instead, we must use the principles of multiobjective decision making to 
develop an MOE for each alternative. The MOE can be compared to the 
cost to define the trade space for the decision maker. 
While the MOEs calculated in this article (Table 1) aligned with the 
preferences of the SSEB, which were heavily weighted towards gunner 
safety, it is possible that the intial Army COEA did not adequately con-
sider what turned out to be the most important objective—gunner safety. 
If we remove that objective from Table 1 and assign equal weights of 0.45 
to Lethality and Tactical Advantage, leaving Procurement with a weight 
of 0.1, the revised MOEs would yield a result similar to the Army’s COEA, 
with LBR receiving the highest MOE. However, it is also possible to select 
FLIR as the preferred alternative based on Figure 1 (cost-effectiveness) 
if the SSEB considered effectiveness to be much more important than 
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cost, basically concluding that the FLIR was worth the extra money. Both 
cases illustrate the subjective nature of effectiveness analysis and why it 
is so important to explicitly model objectives and preferences.
Second, we note that the three proposed guidance technologies had 
different levels of risk. We used this information to calculate the expected 
MOE for each alternative, thus incorporating uncertainty into the analysis. 
The probabilistic MOE can be compared to the expected cost (in our case, 
cost per kill) to present a risk-adjusted trade space for the decision maker. 
To the best of our knowledge, neither the COEA nor the SSEB used a quan-
titative risk-adjusted trade space as presented in Figure 2 in their analysis, 
although it is likely that they considered technology risk qualitatively. The 
risk-adjusted model presented in this article would have provided a clearer 
picture of the impact of technology uncertainty on the trade space.
Third, we show that a real-options approach allows us not only to 
incorporate uncertainty in our analysis, but also to calculate the value of 
the option based upon risk. This leads to different option values for differ-
ent alternatives based on the technology maturity. Using this approach, 
the Army should have offered each development team a different amount 
of money to develop their proposed technology. Doing so would have better 
allocated the dollars to manage risk.
Fourth, we note that the final cost to fix the FLIR guidance technology 
selected by the Army turned out to be significantly higher than the $30 mil-
lion originally paid to develop the technology. This is in line with what our 
Real Options Valuation Model suggested, since the FLIR technology was 
always anticipated to be the riskiest. 
The use of risk-based Real Options Valuation Models allows us to esti-
mate the value of flexibility in acquisition decisions. Understanding this 
value allows program managers to assign program dollars based on risk and 
supports the efficient use of limited program resources. Program manag-
ers can develop more effective capabilities more efficiently by improving 
and expanding their understanding of the potential and use of real options 
in acquisition. Future research can facilitate these improvements by 
investigating the role of real options in other development phases such as 
development for production, the impacts of imperfect information obtained 
through options that inaccurately indicate the feasibility of a technology, 
and other aspects of real options in acquisition.
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Endnotes
1 The objectives, metrics, weights, and values used in this example were 
developed by the third author, a program manager for the Javelin who was 
deeply involved in the Army evaluation process. The Services procuring 
the Javelin system did not actually use this exact methodology for the 
selection of the Javelin guidance technology, but used something similar for a 
weighted decision analysis of the three alternatives.
2 The probabilities of success and failure as well as the costs for each 
technology were estimated by the third author based on extensive 
experience as a program manager for the Javelin.
3 The Army’s actual Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) also 
found that the LBR was the preferred alternative.
4 The focus in the current work is on the technology development phase 
and the feasibility of the technologies (e.g., as measured with the TRL), as 
opposed to their readiness for production. We assume that the options 
provide perfect information on the feasibility of the technology.
5 The expected cost with option assumes perfect information relative to the 
success of the technology development effort.
